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The nature of these programs has evolved significantly 
as we have all learned from our experiences and 
mistakes... Private sector initiative and market 
mechanisms are important, but they must go hand in 
hand with good governance...
- Barber Conable, Foreword
Growth does not necessarily reduce poverty or provide 
food security.
- Page 45
The division of responsibilities between the state and 
the private sector should be a matter of pragmatism - 
not dogma -
- Page 55
Policy analysis is very difficult in the absence of 
reliable and timely data.
- Page 58
On the Long Road
The World Bank's Sub-Saharan African - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Long 
Term Study) is the best of its series of continental overviews which began 
with 1981's Accelerated Development and arguably the best SSA continental 
study from any source with apologies to ECA's African Alternative Framework 
whose clear and sweeping vision is marred by a very uneven quality of 
analysis.
This is a serious, informed, reasoned, pragmatic study. While its enthusiasm 
for private and unregulated market solutions and for a multitude of tiny 
collection user fees appears at times to rest on faith more than logic or 
experience, that is not true of most of its conclusions or proposals.
Clearly the Bank has learned much since 1981 - indeed it has structurally 
adjusted its own approach. Growth is seen as pre-condition for regaining 
macro balance and attaining structural change. Further it is argued
convincingly that it must be humanly sustainable (equitable) and also 
physically sustainable (environmentally sound). This is light years away from 
the 'external debt service first...stabilise by cutting' straw person still 
frequently set up by Bank critics.
And A Winding One
The Long Term Study does demonstrate learning from experience and - 
refreshingly unusually for a Bank published study groups the Bank as among 
those learning from their own errors. That can only add to its credibility - 
especially in SSA. For example human investment and meeting basic needs are 
restored to priority status (on economic as well as human grounds) and their 
early 1980's downgrading bluntly portrayed as disastrous. Even more important 
the uses of labour intensive methods to build and maintain key infrastructure 
and of rising primary access to basic services are at least partly linked to 
overall resource allocations not treated as 'add ons' .
The vital role of maintenance in making any overall level of investment 
efficient (sharply challenged when a few African governments and other 
analysts raised it at the end of the 1970’s) is presented as conventional 
wisdom. The cost of South Africa's total onslaught on its neighbours receives 
boxed attention for the first time in a Bank study.
"Governance" is the LTR's somewhat coded amalgamation of governmental and 
institutional capacity, efficiency, appropriateness, accountability, probity 
and legitimacy. It might be better to divide these topics more as some are 
easier for an interstate governmental body to treat in depth than others and 
in different countries the key problems of governance vary tremendously. To 
give the impression (however unintentionally) that the governance problems of 
Tanzania or Mozambique are analogous to those of Zaire or Sudan is not exactly
helpful. But that the LTR has managed to speak openly of inequity oppression,
systemic corruption and to call for organised domestic criticism and
countervailing power is as refreshing as it is courageous.
Not least From Crisis to Sustainable Growth really is long term in nature of 
analysis and issues, not a crisis management exercise with projections tacked 
on which seem to reflect slightly more efficiency by all parties on crisis 
management, but not necessarily much more. There is an intriguing implied 
shift here - structural adjustment to a flexible model which is self adjusting 
is seen as running into the next century. Structural Adjustment country
3strategies were initially 3 to 5 years and have de facto gone to 7 to 10.
Will they now become rolling open ended? That would fit the LTR's advice that 
external support be focussed on agreed sustaining and advancing of what an 
African state has begun to do rather than on payment for conditions de facto 
imposed on present and future policy shifts. Certainly such a shift - which 
has perhaps begun in a limited way - would both encourage African initiatives 
and policy capacity building and lessen the very dangerous tensions typifying 
front end loaded high conditionality, back end lagged and uncertain resource 
flow 'agreements'.
With Smudged Map And Muddy Tracks
The LTR rightly indicates that low GDP growth, high population growth, falling 
capacity utilisation and plummeting efficiency of investment are basic to 
SSA's disastrous 1980's economic performance (and to longer records of failure 
in a significant number of countries). But it seems inadequately aware that 
this is either a process description or a causal linkage model in which the 
directions of, and feedbacks from, linkages are less than clear and may well 
vary by country and period.
One example is labour cost and productivity. Many SSA unit labour costs are 
high. That is beyond doubt. So are a number of reasons - not least inability 
to operate near institutional or plant capacity. But - at least in many 
countries - wages are arguably below the minimum efficiency level, e.g. in 
Tanzania the monthly minimum wages is $10 while the minimum household 
expenditure to stay out of absolute poverty is about $40. In other countries 
- e.g. Ghana and Mozambique - the minimum wage is $20 to $30 and the 
expenditure needed for staying out of absolute poverty also about $40. In 
practice informal incomes of non-wage family members can produce 50% to 67% of 
wage income; but rarely 100% to 300%. Arguably then higher real wages are a 
sine qua non for rising labour productivity - a proposition Mauritian, 
Botswanan, South Korean positive and Philippine, Ghanaian and Tanzanian 
negative experience would seem to bear out.
In part this type of problem flows from the use of averages which may 
homogenise quite different real problems and causes into an average which 
describes only a handful of cases. For example the LTR shows that over 1961- 
1986 SSA terms of trade fluctuated sharply but fell little; for oil importers 
they fluctuated and fell; for low income economies they fluctuated and - 
especially in the 1970's - collapsed and for oil exporters they exploded (from
4the lowest levels in over 100 years) in 1973/74 and 1979/80 then eroded with 
1984 and 1986 collapses. Much - not all - of the analysis concentrates on the 
average concluding that terms of trade had limited overall impact. This may 
mask several specific propositions: a) most African states have managed
volatility badly - perhaps booms worse than falls; b) in the 1980's there 
have been pretty general falls with demonstrable severe damage; c) for 
several low income countries, the falls since the mid-70's are up to a tenth 
of real GDP; d) booms impede shifts in production structures (or cause 
perverse ones) and slumps snatch away the resources for them (and cause 
different perversities).
In fact the LTR (like everyone else including the author) has no workable long 
term trade restructuring strategy articulated enough to be implemented. Over 
75% of SSA's non oil export earnings (or 80% overall including oil) come from 
products for which higher SSA exports will probably reduce total gross SSA 
(not merely global producer) earnings. In the short term there may be no 
option for any country except raising export volumes for these problems, but 
that cannot be even a medium term strategy. Articulated, country specific
work on viable multi product export structures is vital - but is in fact given
very low priority, not least by the Bank.
The LTR's call for smaller - as well as more efficient - government and
criticism of an average 27% government capital plus recurrent spending to GDP 
ratio contrasts oddly with its pragmatic prescriptions. These imply 12-15% 
Government Recurrent spending to GDP ratios plus 15-17% public sector 
investment (in infrastructure, human resources and joint ventures) for a total 
of 27% to 32%. More efficient with more resources to a narrower range of 
prioretised uses, yes. But smaller?
As is too common in Bank work, the revenue side fiscal policy seems divorced 
from operational reality. It is not true that most human services can be 
largely self financing and broadly accessible - detailed Bank service by 
service country studies suggest 10% to 20% realistic maxima for health and 
education. Nor is it clear why a clear case for more selective, lower export 
taxes is translated into opposition to all "producer" (income?) taxes ratherly 
oddly termed "trade" taxes. Both the need for the fees and the unclarity of 
the tax shifts sought might be helped by articulation of practicable, simple, 
buoyant, relatively progressive, one stage, multiple rate consumer taxes 
neutral between imports and domestic production to be the central revenue
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argued and not clearly refuted in the LTR - a perfectly attainable objective 
in the context of sustained, equitable growth.
The LTR usually escapes the pitfall of over-enthusiasm for the relatively 
untried (or unexamined, or once touted then lost to sight and now 
retrumpeted). Equally it seeks to avoid comparing the actual present warts 
and all with ideal constructs of alternatives (a common cause over 1960-80 of 
over-enthusiastic and often self defeating attempts to curb very real market 
failures by regulations which in practice created different failures).
Usually, but not always nor fully successfully. The "informal" sector is not 
homogeneous. Most is either low productivity, limited flexibility by nature 
or desperate survival innovations which are vital but not part of the answer 
to positive structural change. Separating these from the truly dynamic bits 
is important for devising strategies/environments for (often for getting out 
of the way of) the latter. Similarly the new respect for 'traditional'
African long rotation agricultural practice is now coming precisely when 
population/land ratios make it impracticable unless research can provide ways 
to shortening rotation without ecological disaster. Peasants are quite ready 
to innovate and see the problem, but usually have not the knowledge to use, 
nor the choice of eating still less now to avoid future land degradation.
With Illegible Milestones
The LTR's call for more timely and more reliable statistics with priority 
given to those users want (as opposed to those Central Statistical Offices 
want to prepare by their favoured methods at a snail's pace) is welcome. But 
at points one wonders whether its authors fully realise how bad the empirical 
foundation for some analysis and proposals is. e.g. on population growth 
rates do we know how much (or even if in several cases) they have risen? 
Tanzanian estimates are 2.75% to the late 1960's; 3.3% to the late 1970's and
(since the last Census) 2.75% for the 1980's. But the 3.3% (as the author 
then argued) almost certainly rested on failure to correct for undercount in 
1967 relative to 1977 so that - in this case - the most plausible supposition 
is no significant change; in itself a real problem. The data compound 
another issue - so long as real pauperisation and food insecurity are rising, 
basic services access falling and infant mortality stagnant, can any 
population policy do much to address the basic causes of high birthrates?
With rising real incomes and access to services and declining penury and
6infant mortality, population policy can help speed transition to lower 
birthrates - vide Mauritius - but otherwise? Arguably food security, infant 
mortality and female literacy are the key fronts on which population strategy 
must be fought today in a majority of SSA countries.
The food production and price data are equally fragile and potentially 
misleading. For example from 1980-81 to 1986-87 Tanzanian food output rose 
about 20% and population about 15. How is a 14% decline in per capita food 
production (and an increase in average calories available) reached? (From 
composite use of incompatible sources?) If - as is true - official low food 
prices to consumers rarely held up after the late 1970's why suppose by-passed 
official channel grower prices did? e.g. in Nigeria in the 1970's the least 
bad estimates show grower food prices rising faster than the consumer price 
index or wages. 1979-1984 Tanzanian parallel (but hardly seriously regulated 
much less suppressed) retail market prices for food (used in official COL 
statistics) suggest a similar pattern there. LTR does not really address what 
these data weaknesses and inconsistencies may mean.
And On A Shaky Bridge
The LTR rightly advocates for a long term strategy, less chopping and
changing, more patience. But are its projections of 1% per capita output
growth and 0% per capita consumption growth for the next decade "sustainable"? 
Or will they lead to implosion by growing despair even if explosion by 
desperation is avoided? That is a real question in long running, moderately 
successful SA efforts (e.g. Ghana 1983-89, Tanzania 1984-89) and one poor 
Africans and African programme implementers/designers ask with a frequency and 
intensity the LTR does not reflect.
True, the LTR seeks to reconcile its renewed primacy for basic needs with 0 
consumption per capita growth by calling for reallocation (-5% annual top 
income consumption per capita and +2% bottom increase; reducing hospital 
expenditure to support clinics). Analytically this is hard headed but soft 
hearted. Politically it is unlikely to be possible. Reallocation out of 
increased total resources can be done in many contexts; radically cutting the
top to transfer to the bottom out of stagnant resource flows tends to require
a violent revolution (not that most revolutions do, in the event, redistribute 
in that particular way).
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avoid posing it at all! If the answer is that implosion and/or explosion are 
likely at 4% to 5% annual growth rates (1% to 2% per capita) what then? Is 6% 
to 7% growth widely attainable by 1995 - e.g. by 2% to 3% annual average 
efficiency of resource utilisation/operation gains? Can raising domestic 
savings ratios be phased more slowly - e.g. by concentration on 
rehabilitation, debottlenecking, recurrent human investment, productivity 
enhancing research? (The LTR if anything over-estimates probable new external 
flows plus debt relief so that would be a dubious deus ex machina.) 
Sustainability requires looking at those questions squarely.
But this somewhat grim warning should not take away from what From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth has achieved. Nor should it be forgotten that to be able 
to query specifics and components (even if quite important ones) in an overall 
presentation - analysis - agenda, one must have a basically plausible, even if 
incomplete or flawed, foundation of data, interpretation and conclusions for 
action. That LTR does provide.
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